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We examine the intertemporal allocation of the solid waste of cities within the United
States to spatially distributed landﬁlls and incinerators, taking into account that capacity at
existing and potential landﬁlls is scarce. Amendments have been proposed to restrict waste
ﬂows between states by means of quotas and surcharges. We assess the aggregate surplus loss
(and its regional distribution) resulting from proposed policies. In addition, we ﬁnd that limi-
tations on the size of shipments to any one state can have the perverse effect of substantially
increasing interstate waste shipments as states export smaller volumes to more destinations.
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INTRODUCTION
The growing trend in interstate shipments of solid waste in the United States
is a topic of substantial public debate. There have been numerous Supreme Court
decisions concerning the control of waste shipments in the context of the Interstate
Commerce Clause and several recent congressional proposals to exempt waste gen-
eration from the jurisdiction of that clause. To date, however, very little is known
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about the effects such proposed restrictions might have on the interstate waste
market.
Our researchevaluates th e potential economic effects of public policies proposed
to restrict ﬂows of municipal solid waste (MSW henceforth).3 These restrictions
include local or state requirements stipulating where waste must be landﬁlled, pro-
hibitions on the import or export of waste across state boundaries, quantitative
limits on these ﬂows, and extra fees levied on imported waste. We focus on the
aggregate surplus loss (and its regional distribution) that would result from such
controls. Such losses would arise because more distant or higher-cost disposal facil-
ities would have to be used if lower-cost choices are proscribed.
Some of the questions our paper addresses include: (1) If interstate trade in MSW
is banned, what is the social surplus associated with the autarkic allocation which
results? Are the changes in surplus likely to differ among regions of the country? If
so, are some better off and others worse off than before the ban? (2) If interstate
trade is permitted but quantities of waste imports or exports are restricted, what
are the effects on the public in various regions of the country? In the associated
competitive equilibrium, (3) What are the effects on producers and consumers of
such quantitative restrictions? (4) If higher fees are charged for waste disposal when
the waste originates outside the state, what are the economic effects on different
regions of the country and on producers and consumers?
We base our approachon a central planning model of interstate waste trade
developed recently by Gaudet, et al. [5]. Their model characterizes the efﬁcient
allocation over time of spatially differentiated resources in ﬁnite supply suchas
the nation’s waste disposal facilities. We add policy constraints to their theoretical
model and then implement it on the computer.
In Section 1, we offer some background information on MSW and the interstate
waste market and then brieﬂy review proposed legislative developments to restrict
interstate shipments of waste and the arguments underlying the debate over them.
Section 2 presents the model. We apply the model to two regions of the United
States, the Northeast and Midwest. These regions account for about 80% of inter-
state trade by volume and involve volumes large enoughto be subject to restric-
tions proposed in pending legislation (for example, in a recently passed Senate bill
described below, two of the bill’s three allowable restrictions apply only to large
volumes of waste exports or imports). We also focus on waste that is landﬁlled,
as this is the disposal method for most interstate waste. However, an important
input in our model and one to which its results are sensitive is the cost of alter-
native disposal methods. We calibrate our model using publicly available data on
waste generation, waste disposal and transportation costs, estimated demand elas-
ticities for waste generation, and other information. We discuss these inputs to our
simulation model in Section 3 and the resulting baseline simulations in Section 4;
in this section we also test the sensitivity of our model to several key assump-
tions. We then impose various restrictions on the model to investigate the effects
of several recently proposed constraints on interstate waste ﬂows: (1) restrictions
on the volume of waste exports, (2) an outright prohibition of interstate shipments,
3Strictly speaking, two types of such restrictions on the ﬂow of waste are the subject of current debate:
so-called ﬂow control and restrictions speciﬁcally on interstate shipments of waste. Both of these restrict
the ﬂow or shipment of waste, but ﬂow control generally refers to within-state restrictions (even though
these may also impact interstate shipments). Our focus is on interstate restrictions.efﬁcient solid waste management 3
(3) surcharges on imported waste, and (4) a combination of surcharges and volume-
based restrictions. We estimate the effects of these restrictions on interstate waste
ﬂows, aggregate surplus loss, and the regional distribution of the changes in surplus.
We also investigate the impact of such policies on producers and consumers in the
associated competitive equilibrium. We present these results in Sections 4 and 5. In
Section 6, we offer some conclusions about restrictions on interstate waste ﬂow.
1. BACKGROUND—MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE AND INCENTIVES FOR
INTERSTATE WASTE TRADE
Our focus on MSW refers generally to the everyday trash generated by house-
holds. The deﬁnition of MSW varies among states and localities, but it usually
includes yard trimmings (which can account for a large tonnage of waste) and
excludes hazardous waste, construction and demolition debris, and industrial waste.
About 210 million tons of MSW were generated in the United States during 1997
(the most recent year for which detailed data are available) or about one ton of
waste per person that year. MSW generation has tended to increase about 5% per
year in recent years. Historically, disposal of MSW has taken place at the near-
est landﬁll, incinerator, or other disposal facility. For a variety of reasons, however,
the amount of MSW transported across state boundaries has been increasing since
the mid-1980s. According to the most recent data about interstate ﬂows, almost all
states routinely import and export some waste (47 states export waste and 44 states
import waste), not just to a neighboring state but frequently much longer distances
(Fig. 1).4 This “interstate waste market” has handled an estimated 20 million tons of
MSW annually in recent years (about 10% of the total MSW generated). Although
this volume may seem small, the transport costs associated with it amount to about
$900 million annually.5
The willingness to bear the transportation costs arises largely from signiﬁcant
differences among tipping fees (the charge per ton to unload a truck at a disposal
facility) across states—much of the discussion here is based on [12]. For instance,
landﬁll tipping fees in the mid-1990s averaged $10 in Nevada, $27 in Ohio, and $75
in New Jersey. These differences reﬂect several related factors, including the closing
of many landﬁlls and public opposition to expanding capacity at existing landﬁlls or
constructing new ones. For example, a trend in interstate waste transport from the
Northeast to the Midwest developed during the early 1990s because of the closing
of many landﬁlls in New York and New Jersey and the inability of northeastern
states to site new facilities. This caused a sharp rise in the tip fee at the remaining
facilities. During 1991–1992, the tipping fee at the Fresh Kills landﬁll, the only
disposal facility in New York City, rose from $80 to $150 per ton (it is now about
$120). Tipping fees in northeastern states typically average $50 or more per ton. In
contrast, the average tipping fee in midwestern states (major importers of waste) is
signiﬁcantly lower, averaging $25–$30 per ton. Thus, even with transportation costs,
it can remain cheaper in many cases for northeastern states to export refuse to
4The map is for 1989–1990, but based on McCarthy [14] these ﬂow patterns appear to have continued
to the present.
5Authors’ calculations, available from authors, are based on average volume, distance transported,
and transport costs.4 ley, macauley, and salant
FIG. 1. Interstate ﬂows of municipal solid waste. Source: National Solid Waste Management Associa-
tion (now Environmental Industry Association), “Interstate Movement of Municipal Solid Waste,” p. 3,
National Solid Waste Management Association, Washington, DC (1992).
landﬁlls in the Midwest. For example, assuming transportation costs of 10–15¢ per
ton mile, the per-ton cost of shipping waste from New York to Ohio is just $75–$95,
including Ohio’s average tip fee of $25 per ton.
The growing trend in interstate waste transport has been opposed by citizens’
groups, environmental organizations, state legislators, and others. They express con-
cern about being a “dumping ground,” the impact of landﬁll growth on local prop-
erty values, and the limited capacity of local landﬁlls. This opposition has led many
states to ban, differentially charge, or impose other restrictions on imported waste.
As of 1993, 41 of the 48 contiguous states had considered or enacted legislation to
restrict the ﬂow of waste across their boundaries.
Most of these restrictions have been struck down by the courts as violations of
the Interstate Commerce Clause of the United States’ Constitution. When state
regulations place an “undue burden” on commerce, including the trade of waste,
they are deemed to be unconstitutional. In a landmark decision in May 1994, the
Supreme Court ruled 6 to 3 against a municipal ordinance that MSW generated
within the state of New York be managed at a designated waste processing facility
ﬁnancially backed by the town of Clarkstown (Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown).6
The Court ruled that the ordinance discriminates against interstate commerce even
though it prohibits waste from being sent to other local waste transfer stations
as well. The Interstate Commerce Clause does, however, empower Congress to
allow states to regulate commerce, and Justice Sandra Day O’ Connor’s concurring
opinion in Carbone explicitly noted that it is within Congress’ power to permit
6See C&A Carbone v. Clarkstown, US SupCt, No. 92-1402, 5/16/94.efﬁcient solid waste management 5
local controls on waste ﬂows. Since the mid-1990s,7 the Congress has proposed
numerous bills to allow controls. In Fall 1995, the Senate passed particularly detailed
legislation, S. 534, “The Interstate Transportation of Municipal Solid Waste Act of
1995” amending the Solid Waste Disposal Act. Titles I and II of the bill attempt to
affect waste ﬂows. Title I of the bill grants state governors the authority to restrict
out-of-state MSW imports to 95% of their levels in 1993 and to increasingly smaller
percentages over time (ending withcalendar year 2003 and eachsucceeding year,
when the limit is to be 65% of the amount exported in 1993), provided imports
exceeded 750,000 tons per year in 1993. Title I also restricts the amount of waste
that exporting states may ship to any one state. The restriction is the greater of
1,400,000 tons or 90% of the amount exported to the state in 1993 and increasingly
smaller amounts over time (ending withcalendar year 2002 and succeeding years,
when the limit is 550,000 tons). An exception to this export restriction is if landﬁlls
or incinerators in the importing state are authorized to receive out-of-state waste
or have agreements with the host community that permit such imports. A third
provision in the title permits importing states to collect a “cost recovery charge”
not to exceed $1 per ton, for the processing or disposal of out-of-state waste.
Title III of the bill permits jurisdictions to control waste ﬂows by requiring that
they be handled (for recycling, transfer, processing, or other management) at spe-
ciﬁc waste facilities, alth oughgenerally only if suchcontrols h ad been operating
prior to May 15, 1994 (the date of the Carbone decision). In most provisions of
this Title, interstate ﬂow controls may continue only until the end of the remain-
ing life of contracts between the political subdivision and its contractors—see, e.g.,
[12, 24] for additional discussion of restrictions on interstate shipments. In subse-
quent legislative proposals, various of these quantity and surcharge provisions have
been retained (see, e.g., S. 663 and its companion bill in the House of Representa-
tives, H.R. 1190, bothproposed in March1999).
2. OVERVIEW OF THE MODEL
We turn now to the model we use to assess empirically the consequences of these
proposed restrictions. We use these restrictions because they represent well the
types of constraints that the Congress has debated, but our model is amenable to
other formulations of constraints. In addition, since estimates of parameters asso-
ciated with the landﬁll market differ widely, we have made the model as ﬂexible as
possible and report a variety of sensitivity tests of our empirical assumptions.
A “central planning” model suchas ours h as a variety of positive and normative
uses.8 Suppose ﬁrst that there are signiﬁcant externalities either in transporting
waste or in landﬁlling or incinerating it. If these externalities are taken fully into
account, our model can be used to compute the socially optimal plan over time and
space. This would be valuable as a goal toward which regulatory policy should guide
the industry.
7For example, draft bills on ﬂow control/interstate transport have included a bill sponsored by Robert
Smith (R, NH) and John Chafee (R, RI) in the Senate, a bill sponsored by Michael Oxley (R, OH) and
Christopher Smith (R, NJ) in the House of Representatives, and a bill sponsored by Fred Upton (R,
MI) in the House—see Woods [24].
8Nordhaus [16] used such a model to assess the distortions in the world energy market attributable
to OPEC’s exercise of market power.6 ley, macauley, and salant
We can also use our model to predict the welfare consequences of existing or
proposed restrictions and can compare these consequences to the welfare predicted
under laissez-faire on the one hand or under optimal regulation on the other.
To predict the consequences of imposing speciﬁed restrictions on a competitive
market in the presence of externalities, we must ﬁrst draw a distinction between
the allocation which arises in a competitive equilibrium and the evaluation of that
allocation. External costs will be disregarded by market participants and hence will
not affect the equilibrium allocation. On the other hand, such costs will affect our
evaluation of that allocation. To compute the competitive allocation we assume that
the planner, like the market, disregards external costs and that, like the market,
the planner is constrained by the speciﬁed restrictions. To evaluate the welfare con-
sequences of the resulting equilibrium, we then value the induced allocation while
taking full account of social costs.
We were unable to ﬁnd data on external costs reliable enoughto reachdeﬁni-
tive conclusions about the effects of landﬁll restrictions. However, positing that the
external cost imposed on a city adjacent to a landﬁll is proportional to the activity
at that landﬁll and to the population density of the city, we reached the tentative
conclusion that the restrictions we study reduce aggregate surplus relative to laissez-
faire and hence a fortiori are far from optimal. Even if further work conﬁrmed this
tentative conclusion about the effects of import restrictions and other regulations,
however, no inference should be drawn about the motivation for such policies. One
possibility is that the electorate in a particular state presses for such regulation to
avoid the additional negative externalities the importation of out-of-state waste into
in-state landﬁlls would impose. Another possibility, which could arise even in the
absence of any externalities, is that in-state voters press for import restrictions to
prevent out-of-state users from bidding up in-state landﬁll prices.9 Our model per-
mits us to study the positive and normative consequences of these regulations but
does not clarify what motivates them.
The computerized model we have developed determines how the capacities of
landﬁlls located in different states in the United States should be drawn down or
expanded over time and which population centers these landﬁlls—in conjunction
with spatially distributed incinerators—should serve. We then use the model to
calculate by h ow muchaggregate surplus would decline withth e imposition of a
variety of political constraints, suchas interstate restrictions under consideration
in the Congress. In addition, we can quantify the distribution of these changes
in surplus across states or other geographical regions and between producers and
consumers of waste disposal.
The lineage of our work can be traced to Hotelling’s [7] model of depletable
resources—see, e.g., Salant [20] for an extensive bibliography and a nontechnical
introduction to the Hotelling literature. Several authors have noted the similarity
between solid waste disposal problems and the depletable resource problem ﬁrst
9For example, Virginia may restrict inﬂows of waste from New York even if unrestricted trade max-
imizes social welfare. For out-of-state demand would bid up tip fees in Virginia and would therefore
lower the equilibrium payoffs of Virginia households and businesses currently using in-state landﬁlls.
Even though these losses would, by assumption, be outweighed by the gains of New Yorkers, New York-
ers do not vote for Virginia politicians. Such politicians may ﬁnd championing voters in their own state
more attractive than defending the interests of New Yorkers and the limited number of Virginians who
would beneﬁt from suchinﬂows.efﬁcient solid waste management 7
studied by Hotelling, including Dunbar and Berkman [2], Chang and Schuler [1],
Ready and Ready [18], and Huhtala [8]. This literature has focused on determining
optimal tipping fees.
2.1. Spatial Aspects of the Landﬁll Problem
These models have not been extended explicitly to an important aspect of the
solid waste industry in the United States that landﬁlls in some parts of the country
are being called upon to serve the needs of “consumers” in other parts of the coun-
try. Suchan extension to a spatial dimension is necessary to evaluate restrictions
that are being introduced to limit waste shipments.
Until very recently, few articles in the Hotelling literature addressed spatial
aspects of resource extraction. To our knowledge there have been three key papers
introducing a spatial element: Laffont and Moreaux [11], Kolstad [10], and Gaudet
et al. [5]. Although only the last of these applies its results to landﬁlls, each of
them can be reinterpreted in terms of this application.
Kolstad [10], for example, can be regarded as considering the case of two landﬁlls
serving multiple cities. His approach, however, limited him to a particular spatial
conﬁguration: every city had to be located on the line segment connecting the two
landﬁlls. Gaudet et al. [5] relax this spatial restriction and hence generalize Kolstad’s
analysis. In their model, I landﬁlls can be located anywhere (not necessarily on a
line segment), J cities (represented by demand curves) can be located anywhere and
the backstop incinerators can be located anywhere. Gaudet, Moreaux, and Salant [5]
(hereafter GMS) then determine the solution to the planning problem (or, equiva-
lently, the solution to the competitive equilibrium in the absence of externalities).
In the solution to their planning problem, the shadow price on initial reserves in
pool i has the multiplier λi. The multiplier on reserves in that pool at t is λiβ−t,
where β is the discount factor (β =  1 + r −1, where r is the real rate of interest).
Consider city j at time t. To serve that city then at least cost, the planner would
select the ﬁll with the smallest full cost—taking account not merely of the trans-
portation cost (cij) but also of the current shadow price of landﬁll space. In the
decentralized version of this problem, title to one unit of unused space in landﬁll i
would initially sell for λi. For sucha riskless asset to be h eld, its price must rise by
the rate of interest (β−1 − 1 . A competitive operator of landﬁll i would be willing
to collect one unit of city j’s trashand transport it back to its ﬁll for disposal at a
price of cij + λiβ−t. The supply price offered city j net of the cost of transporting
its waste to ﬁll i is referred to as the tip fee of ﬁll i. In GMS’s unregulated case, the
tip fee charged any city at time t would be λiβ−t. City j, of course, can be served
by any of I landﬁlls and so would face I supply prices. It would buy from the facil-
ity with the cheapest supply price. A similar story applies to each of the J cities.
Ultimately, the initial prices of titles to one unit of space in each of the I ﬁlls is
determined by the computer algorithm so that cumulative space used in every land-
ﬁll equals its initial capacity. In the GMS model, (1) no city uses more than one
landﬁll at the same time, (2) every patron of a given landﬁll is charged the same
tipping fee at a given time, and (3) every tipping fee rises at the rate of interest.
Figure 2 illustrates the three best choices facing city j at time t in the GMS
model. The supply price of ﬁll 1 is smaller than the supply price of ﬁll 2, which in






Supply Price of Fill 2
c 2j+ λ 2β -t
c 1j+ λ 1β -t




Transportation Costs between Fill 1 and City j
Net Producer Surplus of Fill 1 from City j in t
Net Consumer Surplus of City j from Fill 1 in period t
FIG. 2. GMS model in t withtwo landﬁlls and one incinerator available to city j.
would ship all of its waste to ﬁll 1. The supply prices of the other I − 3 sources
are not depicted. The price paid by city j in period t is the smallest of the supply
prices—ﬁll 1’s supply price. We decompose that supply price into its transportation
cost component (c1j) and the “tip fee.” All cities would pay this same tip fee at ﬁll 1.
The shaded areas correspond to net consumer surplus at city j and that portion of
net producer surplus generated from ﬁll 1’s commerce withcity j (revenue net of
transport costs from transactions withcity j but not from transactions withoth er
cities).
The creation of space in a completely new landﬁll or the marginal expansion of
space in an existing landﬁll can be accommodated easily provided that in neither
case are there setup costs or other nonconvexities.10 In the case of new landﬁlls,
the central planner would be deciding in each period which potential landﬁll to
develop. The following case is trivial to implement and illustrates the strengths and
weaknesses of our approachto capacity expansion. Suppose additional space can
be created at constant marginal cost α but the potential cumulative expansion is
limited to   A units of space. This case can be implemented without change in the
formulation described above. It is infeasible to use space that has not yet been
created. But if expansion occurs at constant marginal cost, space will not be created
until it would be used. Given this, a potential landﬁll can always be represented by
a cost of production α and an initial size   A. By the same token, if this new landﬁll
is located adjacent to an existing landﬁll, the planner would use the new one just
10Nonconvexities cause familiar problems. In the market context, competitive equilibrium may not
exist [3]. The planning problem still has a global optimum but since some nonoptimal programs also
solve the ﬁrst-order conditions, more cases must be examined to locate the global optimum. GMS devote
Section 4 of their paper to a detailed discussion of what can be said in general about the solution of the
planning problem when the opening of landﬁlls involves setup costs.efﬁcient solid waste management 9
as if he were expanding the old landﬁll. To obtain the full marginal cost or supply
price paid by a particular city for using an expanded landﬁll at date t one would
add (1) the marginal cost of creating the space, α, (2) the price of a title to the unit
of the newly created space being depleted, and (3) the transport cost of shipping a
unit of waste between that city and landﬁll. If the marginal cost of creating space
in a particular landﬁll is sufﬁciently large, it would never be developed (implying
that λi = 0). If there are potential landﬁlls in many different locations, the planner
would decide which one is optimal to develop ﬁrst. More generally, the planner
would be deciding when to develop potential new landﬁlls and when to expand old
ones.
The marginal cost of creating additional space need not be constant. It could
increase with the amount of space created in a period or could depend on the
amount of space previously created. Suchformulations are tractable provided th e
resulting planning problem remains concave.
2.2. The Model
Our model appends to the GMS model political constraints relevant to our pol-
icy analysis and then numerically solves for the surplus-maximizing program. The















s.t. xijt ≤¯ xijt ⊥µijt  (2)
xi•t ≤ ¯ fit ⊥ηit  (3)
xi•• ≤¯ si ⊥λi  (4)
xijt ≥ 0 b jt ≥ 0  (5)
The notation is explained in Table I.
The GMS model would consist of the objective function (1), the reserve con-
straints (4), and the nonnegativity constraints (5). To these we add the following
political constraints in various simulations: city–landﬁll interstate ﬂow constraints
(2) limiting the amount that city j can ship to landﬁll i at each t and constraints
on the number of trucks which can access landﬁll i in the same day (3). The latter
constraints arise either because of agreements with the surrounding community or
because of physical restrictions on access.
In the presence of interstate trade restrictions, the deﬁnition of the “tip fee”
charged to city j by landﬁll i requires some clariﬁcation. As before, the tip fee at
time t is the difference between what city j pays to dispose of its waste at landﬁll
i and the transport cost of shipping to landﬁll i: Pjt − cij  But the ﬁrst-order condi-
tions of the planner (or, equivalently, the equilibrium conditions in the competitive
market) imply that Pjt −cij =  λ∗
i +µ∗
ijt +η∗
it β−t  In the absence of interstate trade
restrictions, µ∗
ijt = η∗
it = 0 and the tip fee at t is simply the price of title at time t to
one unit of space in landﬁll i (λiβ−t   However, if the planner is restricted in what
can be sent from city j to landﬁll i at time t, then µ∗
ijt > 0.
One way to decentralize this planning solution is by distributing ¯ xijt permits for




i Landﬁll index; i ∈  1 2     I 
t Time index; t ∈  1 2     T 
j City index; j ∈  1 2     J 
Sk Set of indices of landﬁlls (or cities) belonging
to the same federal state as landﬁll (or city) k
Exogenous inputs
β Discount factor
I Number of landﬁlls (sites existing at the outset or
created subsequently)
J Number of waste-generating centers (cities)
cij Unit transportation cost from city j to landﬁll i
¯ si Initial capacity of landﬁll i
θ Unit cost of the backstop technology
Ujt Q  City j’s utility function for disposing of
Q units of waste at t
Pjt Q ≡ U 
jt Q ; city j’s inverse demand for waste disposal, Q,
at time t (Pjt Q  is net of unit processing costs associated
withwaste collection, compacting, etc.)
Djt P ≡ P−1
jt  Q ; city j’s demand
for waste disposal at time t at price P
¯ fit Maximum amount of waste that could be shipped to
landﬁll i from all cities at time t; it reﬂects
the physical operational constraint of ﬁll i
¯ xijt An upper bound to waste shipped from city j to landﬁll i
at time t (xijt deﬁned below) if there are ﬂow constraints
εj An external cost (in dollars per ton)associated with
disposing waste in the ﬁll adjacent to city j
Endogenous outputs
xijt Amount of waste (in tons) shipped from city j
to landﬁll i at time t
x·jt ≡

i xijt; total amount of
waste (in tons) shipped by city j to all landﬁlls at time t
xi·t ≡

j xijt; total amount of





j xijt; total cumulative amount of waste (in tons)





i∈Si xijt; exports of waste (in tons) at time t
from the state where city j belongs
to the state where landﬁll i is located
mit ≡

j/ ∈Si xijt; imports of waste (in tons) at time t
into the state where landﬁll i is located
bjt Amount of waste (in tons) of city j handled by
the backstop technology at time t
ηit Shadow price (in dollars per ton) associated with ¯ fit
µijt Shadow price (in dollars per ton) associated with ¯ xijt
λi Shadow price (in dollars per ton) associated with ¯ si
then command a market value of µ∗
ijt. Alternatively, the import restriction could be
implemented in a decentralized setting by charging customers in city j a tax of µ∗
ijt
for depositing one unit of waste in ﬁll i. Finally the government could implement
the trade restriction by selling at price µ∗
ijt entitlements to ship one unit of waste
from city j to ﬁll i in year t. In these last two cases, city j would then choose in theefﬁcient solid waste management 11
equilibrium to deposit only ¯ xijt in ﬁll i at time t. Non-source-speciﬁc restrictions on
inﬂows to ﬁll i could be decentralized in a similar manner.
How ﬂow restrictions are implemented in the decentralized solution will have
no effect on aggregate surplus but will affect its distribution. For example, the
distribution of surplus would be affected by the manner in which the ¯ xijt permits
were allocated initially; alternatively it would be affected by how the µ∗
ijt ¯ xijt in
fees collected were dispersed. In our simulations we assume that (1) the fee η∗
it is
collected from all sources (and retained) by landﬁll i and (2) the fee µ∗
ijt is collected
from city j by the state where landﬁll i is located, and it is calculated separately.
As mentioned previously, the presence of ﬂow restrictions results in a number of
phenomena which cannot arise in the GMS model.
Simultaneous Use of Several Landﬁlls. If a ﬂow restriction restricts what city j can
ship to ﬁll 1, city j might ship to ﬁll 2 at the same time. Such simultaneous shipping
never occurs in the unregulated case studied by GMS. Figure 3 depicts the choices
facing city j at a given date t if it is constrained from shipping more than ¯ x1jt to
ﬁll 1. The city ships as much as it is allowed (¯ x1jt) to ﬁll 1 and the remainder (x2jt)
to ﬁll 2. City j pays c2j + λ2β−t per unit shipped to ﬁll 2. We assume that city j
pays the same price to ship to ﬁll 1. As before the tip fee is the excess of what city
j pays over the transport cost since that is what city j would have to pay to dispose
of waste trucked to ﬁll 1. In the presence of import restrictions, the ﬁnal price paid
by city j includes not merely the price of title to the unit of space depleted but also
the price of a permit (or, alternatively, a fee) to ship a unit of waste from city j to
ﬁll 1.
Figure 3 depicts the two tip fees facing city j. Shaded areas correspond to net
consumer surplus at city j and that portion of net producer surplus generated from
FIG. 3. GMS: city j at t withtwo ﬁlls and ﬂow controls.12 ley, macauley, and salant
ﬁll 1 and ﬁll 2’s commerce withcity j. Another city, which could ship to either ﬁll 1
or ﬁll 2 with no ﬂow constraints, would pay the same title price at either ﬁll as city
j in time t and hence the same tip fee at ﬁll 2. However, the effective tip fee at ﬁll
1 for that unconstrained city would be smaller than city j’s since city j is subject to
the restriction and must purchase a permit to use ﬁll 1.
Differential Tipping Fees to Different Cities. If ﬁll 1 also accepts waste in the
same period from a second city—one which is not subject to interstate ﬂow
restrictions—then that city will pay a smaller effective tipping fee. This follows
since that city purchases title to the space it depletes at the same price as city j but
does not have to purchase a permit (or pay a fee) to use the ﬁll. Such differential
charges never arise in the GMS model. This difference in the tip fees charged at
ﬁll 1 does not reﬂect price discrimination against city j but merely the presence
of binding source-speciﬁc ﬂow restrictions in a competitive setting. Different cities
shipping to the same ﬁll and each subject to a separate source-speciﬁc ﬂow restric-
tion would each pay a different effective tip fee to use ﬁll 1—all higher than the
tip fee faced by an unconstrained city. On the other hand, if a set of cities were
collectively constrained to ship no more than a certain amount to ﬁll 1, then each
would have to purchase the same permit price (or pay the same fee) and would
therefore pay the same tip fee—once again higher than what an unconstrained city
would have to pay.
Tipping Fees Rising Faster or Slower Than the Rate of Interest. Until a ﬂow res-
triction binds, the tip fee grows at the rate of interest as in the GMS model. When
the control ﬁrst binds, however, the tip fee grows by a larger amount since the
between-period increase in the fee reﬂects not merely the capital gain on the title
price but also the increase in the cost of the permits to use ﬁll 1. Since the subse-
quent change in the permit price can be positive or negative, the tip fees paid by
cities constrained by interstate ﬂow restrictions can grow slower or faster than the
rate of interest.
3. DATA
Before describing our data in detail, we note several data-related simpliﬁcations
in our simulations. The ﬁrst is that we have selected as our geographic region of
interest the speciﬁc portion of the waste market that accounts for the bulk of inter-
state shipments. This market is 14 states in the Northeast and Midwest; although
this market represents only about 36% of the total volume of waste generated
nationwide, it represents 75–84% of the total volume of waste shipped interstate
(the range reﬂects differences between estimated imports and exports; see below).
Table II lists these states, including the levels of their exports and imports and their
trading partners as reported in published survey data. We use this information to
compare our simulation results for the initial period of the operation of our model
with the actual circumstances at work in the MSW market.
A second major simpliﬁcation is to assume that waste is generated in one, or for
geographically large states, two geographic locations in each state, and that all of
the state’s landﬁll capacity is at this location(s). For example, for New Jersey we
assume that all of the state’s waste is generated in Trenton and that New Jersey’s
entire landﬁll capacity is also located there. Table III lists the locations we haveefﬁcient solid waste management 13
TABLE II
Waste Generated, Exported, and Imported and Trading Partners, 1993
Millions of tons per year Shipmentsa
Waste
generatedb Exports Imports To From
New York 25.2 3.9 0.2 PA, OH, IL, IN Canada
New Jersey 7.3 1.6 (neg.) PA, VA, WV NY
Illinois 14.7 1.0 1.0 IN, OH, WI MO, IN, IA
Missouri 7.5 1.0 0.03 IL, KS (?)
Pennsylvania 9.5 0.8 3.8 OH, WV, IL, IN NJ, NY
Rhode Island 1.2 0.6 — OH, MA —
Ohio 17.5 0.3 1.7 MI, PA, KY, NY, NJ, PA, RI
Virginia 7.6 0.03 1.5 NC
West Virginia 1.7 0.1 0.5 PA,OH, KY PA
Connecticut 2.3 — 0.8 — (?)
Massachusetts 6.8 0.4 0.7 NH RI, NY
New Hampshire 1.1 0.03 0.5 MA, ME MA
Indiana 4.4 0.08 0.8 IL, OH, KY, MI NY, NJ, IL, PA
Kansas 2.7 — 0.7 — MO
Totalsc 109.5 9.8 12.2
Total as % of U.S. 36% 75% 84%
U.S. totals 306.9 13 14.5
Sources: Waste generated from BioCycle, 1994; waste exported and imported from McCarthy [13] (see
also notes therein); shipment destination/origination from [13] and state data available from authors.
a Reﬂecting shortcomings in the available data, trading partners do not always match (for example, NJ
reports receiving from NY but NY does not report shipping to NJ).
b The amount of waste generated that is landﬁlled varies widely across states; most waste that is exported
or imported is landﬁlled, although there are exceptions (in Connecticut, for example, about one-third of
imports go to waste-to-energy facilities (see [13] for discussion)).
c Exports and imports do not match for at least two reasons. One is that states in addition to those listed
above export and import waste; the other is that even in nationwide data, reported exports and imports
do not match—see bottom line above (see [13] for discussion).
chosen for each state (and the acronyms we use to refer to them). We make this
simpliﬁcation because most of the actual data we use to benchmark our simula-
tions are reported for an entire state, not individual localities. This assumption has
a potentially important implication which we discuss below in describing baseline
simulation.11
Our third simpliﬁcation concerns the inverse demand curves. As GMS discuss, a
city’s demand for alternatives to recycling and waste reduction (the city’s demand
for landﬁll space) can be derived from a cost-minimization problem, where waste
which is not reduced or recycled must be landﬁlled (or incinerated). An increase in
the price of landﬁlling (or incinerating, if it is cheaper) would result in more waste
reduction and recycling and consequently less reliance on landﬁlling. Consequently,
the derived demand for landﬁll space (and incineration) is downward sloping.
Moreover, the increased minimized cost which would result from the increase in
the landﬁll price can be measured as the “net consumer surplus” trapezoid under
11Where we have established two locations in a state, we have allocated total state waste generation
between the locations based on their population. We have allocated total state landﬁll capacity between
the two locations based on data in Solid Waste Digest giving landﬁll locations and capacities.14 ley, macauley, and salant
TABLE III
Locations and Abbreviations Used in the Model
Abbreviation Location


















the inverse demand curve. While elegant, this approach requires the following
information for each city12: (1) the cost function for recycling, (2) the cost func-
tion for waste reduction, and (3) the waste ﬂow in the absence of waste reduction.
While at least some of this information is available for Finland [8], it is not avail-
able in the United States. Therefore, in our empirical implementation of the model
we chose a more practical approach which uses available information to derive the
demand curve for eachcity.
We assume that the demand curve for every city is linear with a common slope
but city-speciﬁc intercepts. (We use the quantity of waste which is actually shipped
by that particular city to landﬁlls and the price per ton paid to determine a point of
each inverse demand schedule. We deduce the amount of waste landﬁlled by sub-
tracting from the total waste ﬂow for that city the amount recycled.) A common
initial slope for the inverse demand curves of all cities is chosen so that the elastici-
ties in the simulations match elasticities discussed in the empirical literature on the
demand for waste disposal services (we discuss this literature below). Each inverse
demand curve is assumed to pivot around its vertical intercept at 5% per year to
reﬂect population (and income) growth.
Most of the available data that we use are quite limited for several widely
recognized reasons. States have begun collecting statistics about waste gener-
ation and disposal only recently, and the types of data collected vary among
states. Some jurisdictions carry out detailed surveys to determine quantities of
in-state waste generation and waste imports and exports; others extrapolate using
national data on waste generation per capita in their calculations. Most of our
12While there are virtually no data available with which to estimate the marginal costs of recycling
various materials, we did use anecdotal information on suchcosts on an experimental basis to endogenize
the choice between landﬁlling and recycling. We note these results in Section 5.efﬁcient solid waste management 15
data are from publicly available surveys reported in the trade literature or by state
agencies.13
There are other shortcomings in these data. For example, deﬁnitions of MSW
vary among states. Some include construction and demolition debris or municipal
sludge; others do not. In addition, as noted in Table II, reported volumes of imports
and exports typically do not matchbetween any pair of states (a similar problem
also arises in international trade statistics on imports and exports). Usually, imports
reported by the receiving state exceed exports reported by the shipping state.14
Another problem is that data on average annual tipping fees only approximate
the fees that might be charged under long-term waste management contracts and
the fees charged daily in the “spot” market. The data on landﬁll capacity are also
imperfect; estimates of landﬁll design capacity can change due to landﬁll expansion
or closure or changes in operating permits, and daily operating capacity can vary for
these reasons as well as those related to weather or other short-run conditions. Our
sources of data and our attempts to adjust for some of their shortcomings follow
below.
Demand Price Elasticities and Demand Growth Over Time. We specify linear
demand functions for waste collection and disposal services for eachgeograph ic
state in eachtime period using th e following equation: Qjt =  Aj − B · Pjt  1 + g t,
where Aj is the waste generated in tons, B is a slope parameter, and g is the annual
growthrate. Since we are only interested in changes in the consumer surplus, it
sufﬁces that the linear approximations to the true underlying demand functions
hold around the area affected by the policy changes. The subscripts j and t refer,








Demand grows over time because of growthin income and population. Estimates
indicate that waste generation has been growing about 5% annually during recent
years (see BioCycle, April 1999).15
We parameterize Eq. (6) such that the price elasticity is within the range of pre-
viously reported econometric estimates of the price elasticity of demand for waste
collection and disposal services (see Fullerton and Kinnaman [4], Jenkins [9], Wertz
[23], Morris and Byrd [15], and Skumatz and Breckinridge [22]). These estimates
13Several more stringent environmental regulations governing landﬁll operation, mandated in Subtitle
D of the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act, were to have become effective during this period.
The anticipated results were the closing of substandard landﬁlls and higher operating costs at others.
The trade press reports that indeed, substandard facilities did close, but these were largely small-capacity
facilities. The press reports also, however, that new, large municipal facilities opened to offset the decline
in aggregate capacity. More recent data, when they are available, may shed further light on the effects
of Subtitle D and other changes in the disposal market.
14As noted by a referee, landﬁll operators may have an incentive to understate imports.
15If we were to assume that income grows at rate g and that demand growth is due solely to income
growth, then the income elasticity of demand is unity. As we note above, however, we assume that our
parameter g is a mix of income and population growth. Econometric estimates of income elasticities
are generally small (around 0.05) although some estimates are as large as 0.2 or 0.4 (see discussion and
references in Fullerton and Kinnaman [4]).16 ley, macauley, and salant
generally suggest high price–inelastic demand, on the order of −0 26 to −0 075.
The price elasticities in our baseline model vary across geographic states and over
time; the average across states for 1993 is −0 15. As we discussed in the preceding
section, the linear inverse demand curve of each city is assumed to pivot around
its vertical intercept, its elasticity at any given price will not change. However, in
our simulations, the price a city pays for waste disposal rises over time and, there-
fore, so does the elasticity of demand. Because the most recent econometric data
suggest elasticities toward the less elastic range, we also test the sensitivity of the
model withless elastic demand. 16
Operating Capacity and Backstop Costs. The operating capacity of landﬁlls (tons
per day) are statewide averages reported in various issues of Solid Waste Digest.W e
multiply the daily operating capacity by 300 to convert it to an annual measure.
Incineration costs are also an input to our simulations. We use observed incinerator
tipping fees as proxies for the marginal costs of our backstop technology, although
the backstop can also be taken to include future landﬁlls. We realize that estimates
of capacity and incinerator tipping fees are subject to the problems noted earlier
but we do not adjust for them. In cases where states do not have incinerators,
we used the tipping fee at the next nearest incinerator in a neighboring state to
represent the marginal cost of the cheapest incinerator available to the city (this
amount generated landﬁll tipping fees close to actual reported fees in our baseline
model; we discuss this below). We vary our assumed backstop costs in testing the
sensitivity of the model.
Transportation Costs. We telephoned experts in waste hauling to obtain an esti-
mate of transportation costs per mile per ton of waste. A consensus estimate was 11
cents, although our contacts indicated that these costs are continuing to decline. We
vary this estimate between 5 and 11¢ in sensitivity tests.17 We calculate travel dis-
tances between states using Rand McNally and American Automobile Association
maps.
Discount Rate. We use 5% as the discount rate in our baseline model and use
10% in sensitivity tests.
MSW Generation, Percentage of Waste Landﬁlled, Landﬁll Capacity. Data on the
annual number of tons of MSW generated by a state, the percentage landﬁlled,
and statewide landﬁll capacity are from an annual nationwide survey reported in
BioCycle magazine’s assessment, “The State of Garbage in America.” We use data
from their 1994 survey, contained in the April 1994 issue of BioCycle. Some of these
data are from earlier annual surveys, and data from a few states include a portion of
industrial and construction/demolition waste in addition to conventionally deﬁned
MSW (see BioCycle, April 1994, for details). We did not attempt to adjust the data
for these inconsistencies. In addition, we also used the reported data on landﬁll
capacity remaining in the state although, as noted above, landﬁll capacities can be
16There is evidence that price elasticities can vary markedly among different types of waste but we
do not take that into account (for instance, some waste is more easily recyclable; see Fullerton and
Kinnaman [4] and Sigman [21] for discussion of elasticity differences).
17We spoke withrepresentatives of two long-h aul trucking ﬁrms and one railroad (information avail-
able upon request). Because most waste is moved by truck (only 2% is transported by rail (see Woods
[25])), we use estimates of trucking costs.efﬁcient solid waste management 17
altered through expansion or changes in permitting. We report in our results section
the effect of allowing marginal landﬁll expansion to occur in our simulation.
Interstate Waste Flows. We do not use this information in our model but we
do use it in evaluating our model’s results. Estimates of state waste imports and
exports during 1993 are from a survey by the Congressional Research Service (see
McCarthy [13]) and, where available, additional data were obtained from state agen-
cies that identify waste ﬂows among all trading partners (these data were available
from Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Indiana). A recently updated report [14] shows that
interstate ﬂows continue to follow the patterns in the earlier survey. As noted ear-
lier, because import and export amounts generally do not matchamong partners,
we follow the practice of studies of international trade and use import data. Our
presumption is that importing states have an incentive to collect more accurate
information about waste imports because of citizen opposition to these imports. (In
the case of international trade statistics, import data are usually considered more
reliable because trade management, suchas th e imposition of import tariffs and
quotas, requires detailed information on quantities of imports.)
External Costs. Research to date is inconclusive on the extent to which landﬁlls
impose negative externalities on nearby communities. Two studies, in Massachusetts
and California, estimate external costs in the form of air and water pollution and
noise at $67 to $75 per ton—see discussion in [19]. The U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, however, argues that external effects are negligible, particularly given
the extensive requirements on landﬁlls for containment of leachate and gas (see
[27, 28]). In a study of communities near landﬁll sites in the United Kingdom,
Garrod and Willis [6] found empirically negligible external effects on home values,
although the United Kingdom in 1996 imposed a tax per ton of landﬁlled waste
ranging from $3 to $14 with the goal of, according to the legislation, fostering “an
explicit environmental objective” (the legislation does not further deﬁne this objec-
tive nor does it address the nature of any externalities that decision makers consider
to be associated withth e objective).
If there are external costs invariant both to the level of activity at a landﬁll and to
the source of its waste, neglecting them would not alter our results. Their inclusion
would not affect the competitive allocation since they would be ignored by market
participants. Moreover, they would not affect our welfare conclusions either since
we restrict ourselves to reporting changes in welfare.
External costs wh ichdo vary withth e level of activity at a landﬁll would affect
our results. To illustrate how such externalities would be handled if the future data
conﬁrm that they are nonnegligible, we conduct sensitivity analysis. As suggested
in Repetto et al. [19], we hypothesize that the external cost imposed on a city
adjacent to a landﬁll is directly proportional to the tons deposited in that ﬁll and
to the population density of that city compared to the average density of all the
cities. We then determine the socially optimal allocation and compare the associated
net surplus to the net surplus associated with the baseline allocation after external
costs are deducted. We also calculate how this maximized social surplus would be
distributed in a competitive equilibrium assuming that the revenue from an optimal
Pigouvian tax on users of each ﬁll is redistributed lump sum to the victims of the
pollution. Finally, we investigate the degree to which proposed policies will improve
on the laissez-faire allocation given the hypothesized externalities.18 ley, macauley, and salant
4. BASELINE SIMULATION
In this section we discuss results of our baseline simulation. We describe the
prices and allocations in the ﬁrst year (1993) and compare them with the “real
world” data. We also discuss sensitivity tests of the baseline to changes in the val-
ues of its exogenous parameters including demand elasticity, transportation costs,
the discount rate, and the costs of backstop technology (incineration). We also dis-
cuss results of permitting landﬁlls to expand by a small amount. Table IV lists the
parameters we use for the baseline model.
Table V summarizes results of the baseline and, for comparison, actual data on
tip fees and the value and patterns of interstate ﬂows. The parameters we assume in
the baseline generate estimated tip fees and an aggregate volume of interstate ship-
ments that are consistent with available data. The unweighted average of our esti-
mated tip fees is $39 compared with $41, the average in the actual data. Estimated
shipments total 10.2 million tons per year, in line with actual estimates of 9.8–12.2
million tons per year (representing reported exports and imports, respectively). The
pattern of trading partners and the relative volumes of waste traded among part-
ners is also consistent withavailable information. As to speciﬁc volumes trading
between states, experts agree that reported information on interstate ﬂows is highly
inaccurate withrespect to bothquantities and trading partners (moreover, as noted
earlier, reported import and export data typically do not matchup). For th is reason,
it is not clear what role the available information might play as a comparison with
our simulations. In some respects, our simulated pattern of trading partners and
the relative volumes of waste traded are consistent with the reported information.
TABLE IV
Baseline Parameters
Total waste Fill Fill Backstop
generated life capacity Landﬁlled cost
City/ﬁll (million tons/year) (yr) (million tons/yr) (%) ($/ton)
NYC 12.1 5 2.1 59 88
NYB 13.1 9 7.2 59 88
NJ 7.3 4 4.6 38 82
IL 14.7 8 14.1 78 50
MO 7.5 8 6.3 82 50
PAPI 2.0 15 10.5 68 67
PAPH 7.5 7 5 68 67
RI 1.2 15 0.8 79 50
OHCL 11.3 8 6 74 47
OHCI 6.2 8 5.6 74 45
VA 7.6 15 8.5 58 39
WVA 1.7 15 3.3 88 50
CT 2.3 4 1.1 22 70
MA 6.8 4 5.3 25 68
NH 1.1 4 1.1 65 44
INI 3.3 10 2 75 50
ING 1.1 4 2 75 50
KS 2.7 12 4.2 94 50
Note: Demand slope parameter: −0 0002 (demand elasticity: −0 15); transportation costs: 11
cents/ton/mile discount rate: 5%/year; rate of demand growth: 5%/year.efﬁcient solid waste management 19
TABLE V
Baseline: Reported Values and Simulated Results for 1993
Tip fee ($/ton) Interstate shipments
Shipments
Reported Simulated Reporteda Simulateda to (from)b
NYCc 62.75 62.52 3.9 4.8 NJ, PAPh, OH, VA,
WV, CT, MA, IN
NYB 62.75 52.93 0.3 PAPi
NJ 77.14 55.67 1.6 2.5 (4.6) VA, (NYC), PA, WV
IL 25.17 33.29 1.0 (1.0) IN, WI
MO 26.48 33.82 1 IL, KS
PAPic 36.00 27.53 0.8 (3.9) (2.5) (NYB, OHCl), WV, NJ
PAPh55.00 51.05 (0.2) (NYC)
RI 48.48 44.54 0.5 (0.1) (CT), MA
OHClc 33.29 41.33 0.3 (1.7) 2.2 PAPi, (INI), MI, KY,
WV, NY, NJ
OHCi 24.00 30.34 (0.3)
VA 33.75 25.49 (1.5) (2.5) (NJ), NC
WVA 29.94 17.49 0.1 (0.5) KY, MD, OH, PA
CT 65.26 50.03 0.1 MA
MA 55.97 42.38 0.4 (0.7) NH, RI, NY
NH 41.36 36.61 0.03 MA, ME
INIc 22.81 42.26 0.08 (0.8) 0.3 OHCi, IL, KY, MI
ING 22.81 33.22
KS 10.32a 24.87 (0.7) MO
Average Tip Fee Total Trade Volume
40.74 39.14 9.8 (12.2) 10.2 (10.2)
Source: Actual tip fee for landﬁlls from Solid Waste Digest, various issues.
aIn millions of tons per year; numbers in parentheses are imports; “reported” shipments are by state
(e.g., for New York state, because the available data are not separately reported for NYV and NYB).
bBoldface type denotes trading partners reported in McCarthy [13] but not predicted by the simulation.
cStates divided in model; see text.
dAverage may be larger; BioCycle (1994) reports $25.
We capture the larger trades among those reported (for example, New York is the
largest exporter and Pennsylvania and Virginia are among the largest importers).
We also capture the largest among the reported trading partners (e.g., New York
and Pennsylvania, Ohio and Indiana, Virginia and New Jersey). Some differences
are that we “overpredict” imports to New Jersey and Ohio, and we “miss” some
trades among small and neighboring New England states (e.g., Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, and Rhode Island). In general, the model yields fewer trading partners
than are reported, particularly among states that trade in small volumes, than the
real-world information indicates.
The model may predict fewer trading partners because of our restrictive assump-
tion (which we made to reduce data collection requirements) about the location of
waste generation and disposal. Our assumption of colocated waste generation and
landﬁll capacity within a state means that for each state, the distance between the
location of generation of waste in the state and that state’s own landﬁll is zero. This





































FIG. 4. Baseline: time pathof tip fees (unweigh ted average).
In particular, the model underestimates interstate shipments:
• among states that are large or whose city/landﬁll sites are in the interior of
the state rather than on its borders (our use of two locations in large states alleviates
this problem somewhat);
• among states where there are many landﬁll locations throughout the state;
• among states for which reported trading partners include states outside
the geographic coverage of our model (e.g., Wisconsin, Kentucky, Maryland, and
Michigan); and
• among states where landﬁll capacity is not near the large population centers
from which waste generation is assumed to originate.
Figure 4 illustrates the time path of real tip fees from 1993 to 2013 (by 2013,
all sites are using their backstop technologies). The unweighted average fee for all
cities increases about 163%. The largest increases are in the Northeast. Note that
whereas it might be expected that the average fee should rise by the rate of interest,
the tip fee is in fact the sum of shadow values on a unit of landﬁll capacity as well
as on the operating capacity of the landﬁll. Thus, for instance, in the case of MO,
the constraint on operating capacity does not bind in the ﬁrst year of operation but
does bind by the ﬁfth year, leading to a 46% increase in the predicted tip fee. In
the case of NYB, however, the operating constraint binds in the ﬁrst year but not
by the ﬁfth year, leading to an increase of just 11% in the tip fee.
Figure 5 illustrates the behavior of these ﬂows over time by indicating the number
of trading partners each year and the aggregate volume of interstate shipments.
Waste traded as a percentage of waste generated increases from 15% in 1993 to
33% in 1998 as states exhaust in-state landﬁll capacity. By 1999, these interstate
ﬂows occur among 11 different pairs of trading partners (e.g., NY–PA, NJ–VA).
After 1999, more and more states begin to use their backstop technology and the
volume and number of interstate trades begin to decline. By 2009, interstate ﬂows
have reached a trickle. It is not clear from debate on interstate waste whether
it is the number or volume of shipments that is of most concern in the public’s
perception. Large numbers of small shipments may generate roadway wear and
tear or congestion, say, and large shipments “use up” communities’ landﬁll space.
Landﬁll Expansion. Expanding a landﬁll is usually quite politically controversial
within the community adjacent to the ﬁll, but municipal and state authorities some-








































































































































Number of Trading Partners
FIG. 5. Baseline: total volume and number of trades.
order of a few percent of capacity. Accordingly, we permitted our baseline model
to expand landﬁll capacity endogenously for 4 years, under three scenarios: expan-
sion at a marginal cost of $5, $10, and $15 per ton. In each case, we assumed that the
annual capacity expansion could not exceed 2%. We ﬁnd that the volume of waste
traded and the number of pairs of states that trade waste are virtually unchanged.
All of the landﬁlls expand and the largest expansions take place at the large landﬁlls
in the Midwest. Figure 6 illustrates the results for expansion at $5 per ton.
4.1. Sensitivity Simulations
We conducted several sensitivity simulations to assess the robustness of the model
to our assumed parameter values; Table VI summarizes the results—more details
are available from the authors upon request. The model’s predicted tip fees change
only negligibly when we reduce demand elasticity, but change widely among states
with the change in transportation costs. We see larger swings in surplus measures. As
would be expected, discounted consumer surplus is very sensitive to the change in
demand elasticity and the discount rate. Discounted producer surplus is sensitive to





























































































































Number of Trading Partners
FIG. 6. Landﬁll expansion at $5/ton.22 ley, macauley, and salant
TABLE VI
Results of Sensitivity Tests: Change Compared with Baselinea
Reducing demand elasticity to −0 01 (average across states)
Volume
Average traded
tip fee (% total)
Discounted present value of surplus, 1993–2013
Producers Consumers Total
1993 <5% >10%
2013 <5% <5%b 0.9 —c —c
Increasing the discount rate to 10%
Volume
Average traded
tip fee (% total)
Discounted present value of surplus, 1993–2013
Producers Consumers Total
1993 (5–10)% 5–10%
2013 >10% ∼ (9.2) (191.7) (200.9)
Reducing transportation costs to 5¢/ton/mile
Volume
Average traded
tip fee (% total)
Discounted present value of surplus, 1993–2013
Producers Consumers Total
1993 ∼d <5%e
2013 ∼f ∼ 1.5 (↓ NE, ↑ MW) 1.5 3.1
Increasing the cost of the backstop technology to $100/ton
Volume
Average traded
tip fee (% total)
Discounted present value of surplus, 1993–2013
Producers Consumers Total
1993 >10%g 5–10%
2013 >10% ∼ (19.2) (wide variation) (44.9) (25.7)
aNotation: numbers in parentheses represent negative ﬁgures, “(>5%)” means a decrease larger than
5% in absolute value. ∼ denotes a negligible change. Dollar ﬁgures are billions of 1993 dollars.
bMost states now use backstop technology.
cThe change in consumers’ surplus based on a linear approximation to the demand schedule around the
baseline allocation cannot be computed here since there are different demand schedules involved.
dFees decrease in the Northeast and increase in the Midwest.
eLargely within state.
fFees increase relatively less in the Northeast than in the Midwest compared with the baseline.
gFees increase in all states and double in the Midwest.
hWe are taking into account the $12.26 billion negative externality unaccounted for previously in the
baseline allocation. The consumer surplus from waste disposal ignoring the externality is $2.2 billion
lower than in the baseline allocation.
effects also vary widely among geographic regions; for instance, surplus is trans-
ferred from producers in the Northeast to those in the Midwest when transportation
costs decline. Perhaps most important for our focus on interstate ﬂows, however,
are the effects of the sensitivity tests on the volume traded and the number of inter-
state ﬂows. Our simulations suggest that when the demand elasticity, discount rate,
and transportation costs are modiﬁed, the volume traded can increase initially but
there is only one additional trading partner. Over time, there is a small or negligi-efﬁcient solid waste management 23
ble change in the volume traded and no change in the number of trading partners.
The response to changes in transportation costs may be heavily dependent on the
assumption we made to economize on data collection about the locations of landﬁlls
and of the origin of the waste generated.
As noted in Section 3, recycling can be accommodated in our model. The model
can be reinterpreted to encompass the case where city j’s waste stream at time t
is ﬁxed but the planner can reduce what is landﬁlled or incinerated by recycling
at a cost a larger portion of the ﬁxed waste stream. The utility associated with
landﬁlling a given amount of waste is, under this interpretation, the cost which is
saved from not having to recycle it. For a full discussion, see footnote 7 of GMS
and the working paper to which it refers. Although we did run some simulations
using this approach, we chose not to highlight them in our discussion because we
judge the data obtainable on recycling costs unreliable. In particular, there are no
data on marginal costs of recycling in the United States (Huhtala [8] presents some
data for Finland). We approximated U.S. costs by using the reported prices offered
by recyclers (by type of material—e.g., plastic or paper), from which we subtract
10%, which we assume to be their proﬁt. We also used data on the national aver-
age percentage composition of the waste stream by type of material and assumed
that the waste streams of all cities can be represented by this average. All data are
from Palmer, et al. [17]. They collected information on prices from various issues
of Recycling Times and Resource Recycling and report the composition of the waste
stream based on Franklin Associates, Characterization of Municipal Solid Waste in
The United States, 1992 Update (report prepared for the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, November). Our results predicted reasonable recycling rates, ranging
from 17% in KS to 25% in NYC. These rates imply a much larger percentage of
waste landﬁlled, and a much larger quantity of waste shipped interstate than our
baseline results. The results of this trial run with endogenous recycling are available
from the authors. As better data become available on marginal recycling costs, we
would like to do more extensive runs withrecycling endogenized.
Finally, we ran simulations assuming that landﬁlling generates negative external-
ities to the inhabitants of nearby cities. We assume that the external cost at a given
landﬁll is proportional to the population density of the city adjacent to it and to
the tons of waste deposited in the landﬁll. We impose an average externality of $20
per ton.18 That is, εj = $20×(densityj/(average density)) is the external cost per ton
imposed on inhabitants of city j because of the aggregate activity of the adjacent













A Pigouvian tax can be used to decentralize this social optimum. All users of the
landﬁll adjacent to city j would pay a tax of εj per ton. This would create a wedge
between what these users pay to use that landﬁll and what the landﬁll receives.
The social surplus in this case equals the sum of (1) net consumer surplus, (2) net
18As discussed, the externality varies with site in proportion to the population density of the adjacent
city resulting (in the order of Table III) in an externality per ton of $64.29, $21.91, $31.43, $33.23, $17.37,
$18.03, $31.83, $23.62, $17.81, $12.79, $9.16, $5.27, $21.90, $32.17, $1.52, $5.49, $6.30, and $5.90.24 ley, macauley, and salant
producer surplus, and (3) government tax revenues less (4) external costs. However,
since the external costs are assumed to be linear, the tax revenues exactly offset
the external costs. For concreteness, we assume that the revenues are paid to the
victims, leaving this group unaffected.
In the presence of taxation, we redeﬁne the tipping fee paid by city j to landﬁll
i as the price paid by city j net of both the Pigouvian tax and the transporta-
tion cost. Hence, in the unregulated case, it would equal the shadow price of the
resource at time t. The existence of an external cost lowers the value of addi-
tional space in the ground. Consequently, the existence of externalities causes both
tipping fees and producers’ rents to decrease substantially, especially in landﬁlls sit-
uated in the Northeast. Consumer surplus from waste disposal falls but less dramat-
ically. The number of interstate shipments also increases as the tip fees fall in the
Northeast.
We can compare aggregate surplus when the externalities are taken into account
to the aggregate surplus when they are ignored. During 1993–2013, $12.26 bil-





t βtεjxj·t. That cost should be deducted from the
aggregate surplus previously calculated for the baseline simulation. Reallocating
the spatial and intertemporal allocation to take account of the hypothesized exter-
nal costs turns out to raise the social surplus by $0.23 billion. How much of this
potential gain is achieved by the three restrictions simulated below? With all three
policies in place, aggregate surplus falls relative to the baseline. Interestingly, one
reason why the aggregate surplus falls is that the total amount of the externality
itself increases when the three restrictions are imposed—dramatically so in some
states in the Northeast. Naturally this conclusion must be regarded as speculative
since it is based on hypothetical data on external costs.
5. POLICY SIMULATIONS
The primary purpose of our model is to understand the implications of various
proposed policies to restrict interstate trade in MSW. In this section we consider
several scenarios. We impose eachof th e following restrictions:
• Surcharges: a $1 surcharge applied to each ton of imported waste.
• Quantitative restrictions: volume-based restrictions on the amount of waste
exported.
• Surcharges and quantitative restrictions: a combination of a $1 import sur-
charge and quantitative export restrictions.
• No trade: prohibition of any interstate shipments.
We model the ﬁrst three of these policies based on provisions in the 1995 Senate
bill and subsequent legislative proposals restricting waste shipments (see discussion
in Section 2). Speciﬁcally, this bill proposes that importing states be permitted to
levy a $1 surcharge per ton of imports. It also proposes the requirement that export-
ing states in 1996 export to any one state no more than the greater of 1.4 million
tons or 90% of the amount exported to the state in 1993; in 1997, the limit is the
greater of 1.3 million tons or 90% of the amount exported to the state in 1993; and
the limit is increasingly smaller amounts in subsequent years (with the restriction inefﬁcient solid waste management 25
2002 and any year thereafter set at no more than 550,000 tons).19 We assume that
these restrictions are perfectly enforced and all tax revenue (or revenue from auc-
tioning licenses to export or import) is redistributed to landﬁll owners rather than
to consumers (those generating the waste). Finally, we assume in these preliminary
simulations that the imposition of the new policy is perfectly anticipated.
Our primary interest is in the effects of these policies on the volume and number
of interstate shipments and on changes in the size and distribution of surplus. We
summarize the results in Fig. 7 and Table VII. We also have results for changes in
surplus among states and for changes in tip fees, which of course drive the changes
in shipments and surplus. We summarize these in the discussion below (details are
available from the authors). Changes in surplus are in terms of discounted present
value, in 1993 dollars.
5.1. Surcharges
Interstate Trade. We would expect that an import surcharge would reduce
imports and the amount of waste traded among states. It would raise the prices of
titles to landﬁll capacity sold to states which formerly exported waste and would
lower the prices of titles to landﬁll capacity in states which formerly imported
waste. When we impose a $1 surcharge on each ton of waste imported, the results
are consistent with these expectations although the size of the effect is small.
The percentage of waste traded declines, although by only about 4%. From Fig. 7,
the total volume of waste traded and the number of pairs of states which trade each
year under this policy compared with the baseline are smaller, but only slightly.
Surplus. Of all of the policy simulations, the $1 per ton surcharge yields the
smallest reduction in total surplus. The reduction is about $10 million. There are
larger losses in total surplus in some importing states than those in exporting
states. Consumer losses are largest in the Northeast, although the largest reduction
there is only about $3 per person (in NYC). Aggregate producer surplus increases
about $160 million; this change in producer surplus includes the surcharge revenue
(which our model ascribes to producers). Some producers in waste-importing states
lose surplus even under this assumption (in OH, WV, and KS). Producers in the
Northeast gain. In many cases, the within-state consumer and producer changes off-
set each other (the offset is realized only if the owners of disposal facilities reside
in the state). Separately calculated, the surplus revenue is about $280 million.
5.2. Volume Restrictions: A Cap on the Volume of
Interstate Shipments Taking Effect in 1996
In this simulation we limit the maximum number of tons that can be exported by
one state to another, following the tonnage limits speciﬁed in the Senate bill. As
per that bill, this upper limit took effect in 1996.
19It is not clear whether states may ship to states with which they did not trade prior to 1993, provided
that shipments meet this quantity cap. Accordingly, we model two interpretations of the cap: (1) states
are subject to the cap but may trade with any state provided the quantity satisﬁes the cap; and (2) states
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TABLE VII
Policy Simulations: Surplus Effects Compared withBaseline
Producers Consumers Total
Surcharge 0.16 −0 17 −0 01
(↓ OHCi, WV, IN)
Export restrictions: −1 19 −0 16 −1 35
cap (↓ PA, VA)
Export restrictions: −1 75 −0 28 −2 03
cap and ﬂoor (↓ PA, IN, VA)
Surcharge, −1 50 −0 40 −1 90
cap and ﬂoor (↓ PA, VA, IN WV)
No trade −2 47 −1 31 −3 78
(↓ PA, OHCi, VA, WV, IN)
Note: Values are reported as discounted $ (billions).
Interstate Trade. We ﬁnd that tip fees increase substantially even prior to the
date at which restrictions take effect. They decline in some importing states and
increase in exporting states; the reduced fees in some states attract increased ship-
ments. These changes yield interesting results in the size and patterns of trade.
The total volume of traded waste decreases about 30%, but as shown in Fig. 7,
the annual volume of waste traded and the number of trading partners increase
throughout much of the entire time period. The increases began immediately in
1993, in anticipation of the date at which the restrictions took effect (1996). Even
when the quantity traded is less than in the baseline (for example, compare the
period 2003–2010), the number of trades exceeds those in the baseline, and there
are more shipments of small amounts of waste.
Surplus. This restriction reduces surplus by about $1.35 billion. The largest loss
is in producer surplus; aggregate loss in producer surplus is about $1.2 billion.
In some waste-importing states producers lose as muchas 25% (in PAPi), but in
other importing states, producers gain from increased shipments (for example, in
WV). Aggregate consumer surplus falls about $160 million. As in the case of the
surcharge, the largest consumer surplus losses accrue in the Northeast. Consumers
in some waste-importing states gain.
5.3. Volume Restrictions: A Cap on the Volume of Interstate Shipments and
Prohibition of New Trade with Any State, Taking Effect in 1996
This simulation imposes the cap described above and prohibits any state from
making any new shipments to any state with which it was not already trading in
1993. Some observers of congressional debate suggest that this combination of a
cap and a ﬂoor on trade is the proper interpretation of the Senate bill.
Interstate Trade. Changes in tip fees are as in the preceding simulation, although
the magnitude of the changes is less pronounced. The ﬂoor prohibiting trade among
states not trading in 1993 prevents the increase in shipments of smaller volume that
result when just a cap on trade is imposed. Both the number of trading partners28 ley, macauley, and salant
and the quantities of waste traded are smaller than in the baseline and in any of
the other policy simulations. Total waste traded falls about 50%.
Surplus. This policy results in the largest loss of surplus except for “no trade”
(discussed below), on the order of $2.03 billion. Aggregate producer and consumer
surpluses bothfall, about $1.75 billion and $28 million, respectively. Th e largest
per capita losses in total surplus are in NYC, about $160. Per capita losses in total
surplus elsewhere are fairly small, on the order of a few dollars. The largest pro-
ducer losses are in PAPi and VA (about $1 billion) and in ING (about $20 million).
Producers gain in some states that export waste in the baseline model.
5.4. Surcharges and Volume Restrictions
The Senate bill permits several of its provisions to be combined. In this simulation
we impose a $1 per ton charge on imported waste, restrict the maximum volume of
interstate shipments beginning in 1996, and prohibit trade between any states not
already trading in 1993.
Interstate Trade. The pattern of changes in tip fees is very similar to the effects
of volume restrictions. The largest difference in results between this simulation and
the others is that there is a spike in the number of trading partners and waste traded
in advance of 1996. Beginning in 1996, the volume and number of trades fall below
the baseline. The total volume traded decreases about 45%.
Surplus. The changes in surplus are similar to the changes brought about when
the cap and ﬂoor volume restrictions are imposed (recall that the surcharge-only
simulation resulted in a very small change in surplus). Total surplus falls about
$2 billion; the reduction in producer surplus is smaller than that in the preceding
simulation because we allow producers to keep the surplus revenues. Consumer
surplus declines about $40 million. The geographic patterns of surplus changes are
similar to those generated by the cap and ﬂoor restrictions. Producers in PAPi, VA,
ING, and WV incur the largest losses, as do consumers in the Northeast.
5.5. No Trade
Here we consider the effect of an immediate and permanent prohibition of inter-
state trade. Tip fees increase substantially in the Northeast and fall in some states
that import waste as there is less demand for their landﬁll capacity. This policy
yields the largest decline in producer, consumer, and total surplus. Per capita losses
in total surplus range from $370 in PAPhand $93 in NYC to 17¢ in IL. Th e total
surplus loss is about $3.8 billion, roughly twice the size of the loss generated by the
volume-based restrictions in the two preceding simulations.
5.6. Summary of the Policy Simulations
As we expected, restricting interstate trade by way of import surcharges or
volume-based constraints reduces aggregate surplus, although producer surplus
can increase. A $1 per ton import surcharge generates less welfare loss thanefﬁcient solid waste management 29
volume-based export restrictions or the combination of an import surcharge and
export restrictions. Prohibiting trade altogether reduces welfare the most. Because
we chose to run these simulations under the assumption that each policy is fully
anticipated, our estimates of welfare loss probably understate the actual loss that
would occur in the real world in which decision makers do not have perfect
information.
In all cases, the reduction in the discounted total surplus is quite small—on the
order of 1% and just 2% when trade is prohibited entirely. The aggregate surplus
changes per capita range from 2¢ per person under a surcharge policy and $177 per
person under volume-based restrictions to $350 per person if trade is prohibited
entirely. Under any of the policies, however, gains or losses accruing to individual
states vary markedly. In addition, different policies result in different distributional
effects between consumers and producers. Under a $1 per ton import surcharge,
producers in the Midwest lose, producers in the Northeast gain, and consumers in
most states lose. Under export restrictions, producers gain in some states, suchas
West Virginia, and lose in the Northeast. Consumers gain in Pennsylvania and West
Virginia and lose in some states in the Northeast.
Perhaps most important, we ﬁnd that export restrictions can actually increase
the number of trades as states reduce the size of shipments to any one state but
increase the number of small shipments to new trading partners. Moreover, an
increase in trade occurs in our model in advance of the actual date on which the
restrictions take effect, largely because tip fees change in response to expected new
trade patterns.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Our model of the interstate waste market is rich in detail and ﬂexibly permits
a wide variety of policy simulations. We believe that it can enrich understanding
of the effects of proposed policies on the waste market, particularly since these
effects can be difﬁcult to predict across states and over time. Despite several limi-
tations of the model, the baseline version performs well when compared to actual
data.
Our model yields two sets of results. The ﬁrst pertains to the effects of public
policies that may affect key parameters of the waste market, such as price elasticity
of demand, transportation costs, or the cost of backstop technologies. As an exam-
ple, if increases in the popularity of substitutes for landﬁlling, such as composting,
were to increase the price elasticity of demand for waste disposal, then the more
likely impacts are changes in the distribution of economic surplus in the waste mar-
ket rather than impacts on interstate trade. In general, we ﬁnd that changes in these
parameters inﬂuence distributional gains and losses rather than the magnitude of
interstate shipments.
Our second set of results pertains directly to the interstate waste market. We
ﬁnd that policies proposed to restrict interstate waste shipments through import
surcharges or volume-based restrictions reduce aggregate social welfare. However,
some geographic areas, consumers, and landﬁll owners can bear relatively higher
costs. At the same time, the surplus accruing to other landﬁll owners can increase
substantially. Short of prohibiting trade entirely, the largest loss in discounted social
surplus occurs under a policy that restricts the maximum ﬂow volume between states30 ley, macauley, and salant
and does not permit states to trade at all unless they had been trading prior to
implementation of the policy. In addition, and perhaps most important, some poli-
cies to restrict exports may actually substantially increase the number of interstate
waste shipments as states export smaller volumes to more destinations in order to
meet limits on the size of shipments to any one state. If these policies are estab-
lished to take effect at a future date, states respond by increasing interstate ﬂows
in anticipation of that date.
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